SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EWEI/LAND GEAR & CNTRL FHEA NO 05-7BA-2002 -1 REV: 03/17/89

LOCATION :67V70 LH J BOX P/N RI

CRIT. FUNC: CRIT. HDW:

QUANTITY 1. NB6GE14-19XXXX

1 103 104 105 Х

X

Х PHASE(S): PL LO 00 DO X LS

102

X

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A- N/A B- N/A C- N/A

APPROVED BY (NASA):

APPROVED BY:

PREPARED BY: J HERMAN KIMURA

COURSEN

DESPHOVE REL TELLER 0/4 EWEI RELTO

VEHICLE

EFFECTIVITY

SSM REL

ITEM:

DES

REL

QE

CONNECTOR, PLUG, 19 #20 CONTACTS - LANDING GEAR DOWN CONTROL CIRCUIT.

FUNCTION:

PROVIDES MATE/DEMATE CAPABILITY FOR WIRING THAT CONTAINS COMMANDS FOR ENERGIZING THE LANDING GEAR CONTROL OR THE LANDING GEAR DUMP CONTROL VALVE SOLENOID. 67V77W61P115

LILURE MODE:

PIN-TO-PIN SHORT (GROUND)

CAUSE(S):

PIECE PART FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, PROCESSING ANOMALY, THERMAL STRESS MECHANICAL

EFFECT(S) ON:

(A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES CRITICALITY EFFECT: (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE (E) FUNCTIONAL

- (A) INADVERTENTLY PROVIDES A GROUND RETURN PATH AROUND THE LANDING GEAR DOWN RELAY CONTACTS FOR THE LANDING GEAR CONTROL OR THE LANDING GEAR DUTTE CONTROL VALVE SOLENOID CIRCUITS.
- (B) LANDING GEARS WILL BE DEPLOYED UPON ACTIVATION OF ARM SWITCH.

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(C,D) LANDING GEARS WILL BE EXTENDED AS SOON AS ARM SWITCH IS ACTIVATED BECAUSE LANDING GEAR DOWN RELAY CONTACTS HAS BEEN BYPASSED WITH A SHORT TO GROUND PATH WITH CONTACTS P-N, J-H, OR J-T SHORTING. THIS MAY OCCUP AT A TIME WHEN THERE IS A LIGHT WEIGHT VEHICLE, STRONG HEAD WINDS AND LOW VEHICLE ENERGY WHICH COULD LAND VEHICLE SHORT OF RUNWAY AND MAY CAUSE VEHICLE DAMAGE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

REFERENCE CIL 05-6BA-2115-3

- DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:
 (A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE:
- (A,B,C,D) DISPOSITION AND RATIONALE
 REFER TO APPENDIX K, ITEM NO. 1 TYPE NB CONNECTOR, CIRCULAR, MINIATURE
- (8) GROUND TURNAROUND TEST
 VERIFY LANDING GEAR CIRCUITRY OPERATION BY TESTING: ARM AND DOWN
 PUSHBUTTON SWITCHES, ARM/DOWN RESET SWITCH, CORRESPONDING LIGHT
 INDICATORS, AND HYDRAULIC VALVE OPERATIONS. TESTS ARE PERFORMED FOR
 EVERY FLIGHT AND LRU REPLACEMENT.
- GEAR IS NORMALLY ARMED AT TWO THOUSAND FOOT ALTITUDE WHICH ASSURES MAKING THE RUNWAY THRESHOLD EXCEPT FOR THE WORSE CASE COMBINATION OF LIGHT WEIGHT VEHICLE, STRONG HEAD WINDS AND LOW VEHICLE ENERGY. CREW TRAINS SHUTTLE TRAINING AIRCRAFT AT TWO THOUSAND FOOT ALTITUDE TO MAKE FLIGHT ADJUSTMENTS TO COMPENSATE FOR INADVERTENT GEAR EXTENSION. IF DOWN RELAY FAILS CLOSED PRIOR TO ARM SWITCH ACTIVATION, CREW WILL DELAY "ARM" UNTIL IT IS SAFE TO DEPLOY LANDING GEAR. CREW WILL SEE "DOWN" PBI LIGHT ON AND THE GROUND WILL SEE THE ASSOCIATED TELEMETRY MEASUREMENT ON WHEN DOWN